• L. Grigoriev, S. Plaksin, M. Salikhov — Post-crisis Structure of Economy and Organization of Coalitions for Innovations
• L. Grigoriev — Investment Process: Stock of Problems and Interests

• S. Guriev, K. Sonin — Economics of the Resource Curse
• L. Freinkman, V. Dashkeev — Russia in 2007: Risks of Slowing Economic Growth against the Background of Institutional Stagnation
• D. Sorokin — The Reproduction Vector of the Russian Economy: 1999—2007

• M. Bodrikov — Labor Theory of Value: Problems and Historical Significance
• D. Frolov — Institutional Evolution of Post-Soviet Institutionalism
• R. Martusevich — Auctions for Concessions in Natural Monopoly Industries in the Context of Tariff Regulation

Abstracts

The article considers alternative variants of strategy formation: "modernization from above" and an approach based on the interaction of "coalitions of interests". To use the advantages of both approaches, it is suggested that a system of interactive control of growth be designed. It should be founded on procedures of compromise making and concerted efforts of the state and "coalitions of actions" such as business and consumers’ associations and trade unions that are already partially organized in Russia. The most important goal of the system is to work out mutually consistent plans of development for different economy sectors. At the first stage, the plans have to ensure fast economic growth by adaptation of western methods and technologies and gradual improvement of institutions as well. These conclusions follow from the analysis of policies of "economic miracle" countries and the theory of reform recommendations.

The article develops methodological approach to the analysis of groups of interests’ influence on the choice of Russia’s development strategy. It is possible to pass on to the analysis of specific issues of economic policy by forming several sub-groups in every "analytical" group. The article also considers the structure of Russian economy which was formed as a result of transformational crisis’ influence on Soviet economy, and relevant international comparisons. Main alternative ways of transition to innovational development are the renewal of Soviet "triangle economy" (the scenario "Mobilization") and complex institutional changes (the scenario "Modernization").

The article focuses on key reasons for capital formation relative lagging during the economic upturn. Still not clear property rights, the long process of formatting of the ownership, weak corporate governance have delayed the turnaround to the investment boom. The structure of economy, sales and industry profitability determines the structure of investments, but it does not lead to sufficient investments in the research sector and manufacturing. The financial sector shows high dynamics, but it can not supply enough "long" money with a huge export of capital. Capital formation has not been influenced by any investment policy. In essence it was the "Inertia" scenario which during the long crisis led to aggravating problems in the economy. These problems have not been solved in the upturn. This situation stimulates the government to use its financial resources in the context of the "Mobilization" scenario that creates more difficulties for the "Modernization" scenario.

The paper surveys economic and political science literature on resource curse, with a primary focus on the role of institutions. These studies show that resource abundance leads now not so much to macroeconomic risks of Dutch disease as to possible deterioration of the quality of government and political institutions. In particular, cross-country evidence on the impact of rising oil prices on media freedom and quality of corporate governance is discussed.

Russia’s institutional development is characterized by negative dynamics of business environment indicators and positive dynamics of investment and credit risk indicators. Reforms for which the state is responsible (legal reform, enforcement, regulation, public goods) are stagnating. In 2000—2007 the progress in developing basic market institutions (property rights, shareholders’ rights, land and real estate markets, state property management, bankruptcy and creditors rights) compared with other emerging markets was insufficient. The analysis suggests that legal and regulative support of economic institutions’ development is inadequate. Legislation chronically lags behind economic reality.

The problem of the Russian economy’s growth rates is considered in the article in the context of Russia’s backwardness regarding GDP per capita in comparison with the developed countries. The author stresses the urgency of modernization of the real sector of the economy and the recovery of the country’s human capital. For reaching these goals short- or mid-term programs are not sufficient. Economic policy needs a long-term (15—20 years) strategy, otherwise Russia will be condemned to economic inertia and multiplying structural disproportions.

The article considers basic propositions of the labor theory of value and related discussions in modern economic literature. It also analyzes different approaches to the solution of the transformation problem. The author shows that the first and unique attempt to ground this theory was made by K. Marx. He also affirms that Marx’s proof has no logical contradictions, but is true only in the specific case of production with one initial resource. The hypothesis is introduced that the Marxist model of the value-price is the convenient basis for construction of the general theory of value.

The author considers Post-Soviet institutionalism as a special social institution of scientific knowledge production. Quantitative parameters and institutional logic of evolution of this scientific current in Russia since 1992 and up to the present are analyzed. It is shown that the «boom» of institutional research has led to the crisis of overproduction of scientific papers and is now gradually turning into stabilization. The necessity of modernization of theoretical and methodological base of institutional economic theory is proved, perspective directions of its development in our country are determined.

Tenders for infrastructure concessions are on the agenda in Russia. The theory of the competitive biddings for concessions originates from the idea of "competition for the field", further developed by H. Demsetz into the franchise bidding theory. But so far, tenders for concessions which took place in different infrastructure sectors have questioned whether the number of bidders was high enough to expect the results (tenders outcomes) predicted by Demsetz. In the article this question is answered basing on the theory of auctions with independent private values and with the price as a single selection criterion under different business strategies of the bidders. Some recommendations are proposed. The necessity as well as some limitations of usage of such tenders’ results for natural monopolists’ tariff regulation are shown.