• Ya. Kouzminov, M. Yudkevich — Beyond Market: Institutions of Governance in the Complex World (Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics 2009 — Oliver Williamson and Elinor Ostrom)
• S. C. Dow — The Psychology of Financial Markets: Keynes, Minsky and Emotional Finance

• E. Yasin, M. Snegovaya — Russia’s Institutional Problems in the Global Context

• S. Avdasheva, A. Shastitko — Economics of Criminal Sanctions on Antitrust Law Violation

• V. May, K. Rogov — Egor Gaidar: Traits to the Future Biography

• L. Grebnev — We Have Lagged Behind. Forever if We Don't Mind? (On the Book by A. M. Libman "Modern Research in Political Economics")

• Economics of Public Sector: A Textbook / P. V. Savchenko, I. A. Pogosov, E . N. Zhiltsova (eds.)

Abstracts

The paper analyzes the qualitative changes in monetary policy goals and instruments during the world economic crisis of 2007—2009 in industrial countries and Russia; it represents the author’s view on Russian monetary policy goals and results on different stages of crisis’ development. On the basis of the analysis the authors conclude on the necessity of active exchange rate policy in Russia, while developing interest rate instruments, and implementation of some exchange restrictions to prevent crisis contagion in the future.

The level of trust in the local currency in Russia is very low largely because of relatively high inflation. As a result, Bank of Russia during crisis times can not afford monetary policy loosening and has to fight devaluation expectations. To change the situation in the post-crisis period Russia needs to live through a continuous period of low inflation. Modified inflation targeting can help achieve such a result. However, it should be amended with institutional changes, particularly development of hedging instruments.

The Bank of Russia intends to introduce inflation targeting policy and exchange rate free floating regime in three years. Exogenous shocks absorption which stabilizes the real sector of economy is usually considered to be one of the advantages of free floating exchange rate policy. However, our research based on the analysis of 25 world largest economies’ exchange rates and industrial production during the crisis of 2008—2009 does not confirm this hypothesis. The article also analyzes additional risks associated with free floating exchange rate regime in Russia and presents some arguments in favor of managed floating exchange rate regime.

The article estimates the short- and medium-run exchange rate pass-through effect on consumer prices on the aggregate level and for individual groups of goods and services for the period from 2000 to 2008. Special attention is paid to the asymmetric exchange rate pass-through. It is shown that the improvement of certain macroeconomic indicators in recent years in Russia has not led to a reduction in pass-through effect on inflation as in other countries. The pass-through effect has a pronounced asymmetrical character, that is, consumer prices are more likely to respond to the depreciation of the domestic currency, than to its appreciation. The largest effect is observed for the food CPI while its costs constitute a significant part of household budget in Russia.

The Bank’s of Russia exchange rate policy influences strongly the competitiveness of national producers at macrolevel. However, the structural consequences of this policy are not thoroughly studied. In particular, it is still almost unknown, which industries and commodities have high, medium or low sensitivity to exchange rate fluctuations. The article considers different approaches to the problem, all based on detailed statistical data. The conclusion is made that any exchange rate policy is an inappropriate tool to influence the structure of Russian economy.

The article surveys the main lines of research conducted by Oliver Williamson and Elinor Ostrom — 2009 Nobel Prize winners in economics. Williamson’s and Ostrom’s contribution to understanding the nature of institutions and choice over institutional options are discussed. The role their work played in evolution of modern institutional economic theory is analyzed in detail, as well as interconnections between Williamson’s and Ostrom’s ideas and the most recent research developments in organization theory, behavioral economics and development studies.

This paper is concerned with drawing on both psychology and economics in order to amplify the psychological content of Minsky’s account of the behaviour which leads up to financial turmoil, and market responses to it. In exploring recent developments in behavioural finance, the author finds that a crucial element is given inadequate attention: the motivation for action under uncertainty. Yet earlier traditions in economic thought (notably the Scottish Enlightenment thought) incorporated the role of psychological motivation under uncertainty. One can see this emerging again in Keynes’s analysis of financial behaviour, and again in Minsky’s financial instability hypothesis. The methodological features of their economic analysis are explored which allow this crucial psychological input to be present, focusing in particular on the role and meaning of rationality.

This third, last article observes the dynamics of the development of Russia, the fourth of the BRIC countries, which have been analyzed in the context of the formation of its institutions and culture. Main factors that create a potential barrier on the way of Russia’s democratization and its transition to the innovation phase are selected. On one side, this barrier is lower in Russia than in other BRIC countries: bureaucracy is weaker than the Chinese one and there is no institutional separation of the society, as in India and Brazil, levels of education are relatively high, while oil export could bring additional resources for the institutional reforms. On the other side, Russia doesn’t have cheap labor force which permits other BRIC countries to postpone the transition to the innovation phase of development.
     Will Russia be able to overcome the barriers to its development in the nearest future, and what is necessary in order to achieve this? This article aims to answer this question.

As of October 30, 2009 changes and amendments in the content of the article 178 of the Criminal Code of Russian Federation have been enacted. They allow to extend the use of criminal sanctions against violators of antitrust law in order to make the enforcement of legal rules supporting competition more effective. At the same time mistakes in the process of enforcement can decrease the efficiency of antitrust in the sense that under the given level of deterrence the burden of type I errors will be higher than the acceptable one. The goal of the article is to discuss the circumstances that can influence the effectiveness of criminal liability.