It is proposed in the article to distinguish between two types of collaboration: a positive (not directed against third parties) and a negative one. I consider the hypothesis that in the process of social development, transaction costs ratio of the three main types of coordination?— competition, power, and collaboration?— is changing in favor of the latter. The mechanisms responsible for the implementation of this tendency are studied, and an attempt to explain its nonmonotonicity is made. It is shown that the strengthening role of positive collaboration is largely explained by cultural changes: the enhance of tolerance culture, the spread of cosmopolitanism and altruism, increasing planning horizon as well as trust radius. I demonstrate the importance of the institutions of positive collaboration in the process of catching-up development; it is shown that shock reforms could lead to the formation of negative collaboration mechanisms. For the further development of these ideas, a program of interdisciplinary researches is outlined.

JEL: B00, B4, B52, N00, P11.
Keywords: coordination, positive and negative collaboration, golden rule of morality, transaction costs, tolerance, cosmopolitanism, altruism, radius of trust, catching-up development.

The second part of the paper considers interconnections and interactions of culture and formal institutions and demonstrates the role of culture in economic development. In particular, it shows the importance of individualism, cooperation, trust, and various forms of regulation. It considers and compares different characteristics of the labor market and social policy. It also demonstrates the feedback effects between culture and institutions in various contexts.

JEL: D02, D72, I32, J12, Z13.
Keywords: culture, values, institutions.

The article reinterprets the classic «free rider problem» known as unsolvable from the position of how the free rider’s surrounding affects him. It introduces the concepts of public and private harm from the free rider’s activity. It also describes a wide variety of manifestations of the "free ridership" in which the private harm suffered by significant social groups is large enough to cause on their part an active opposition to free riders. According to the authors, under proper institutional conditions this opposition results in effective decision of the "free rider problem". They offer a mathematical model of the process: the Markov chain with a single or multiple absorbing states.

JEL: C65, D70, D73, H40, K42.
Keywords: free rider problem, public good, public and private harm, Markov chain, self-adjusting system.

This paper provides a comprehensive assessment of banking competition on the market for loans in the Russian banking system connecting it to various phases of the business cycle in Russia. Our focus is on price competition, which is measured through the Lerner index of market power. Using Lerner index, we investigate, first, the levels of interest rate mark-ups in the market for loans; second, the influence of these mark-ups on credit activity of banks as well as their relation with the size of banks. Next, we compare our measured Lerner index with three additional competition indicators, i.e. H-statistics of Panzar and Rosse (mix of price and quantity competition), Boone indicator (quantity and quality competition) and Herfindahl—Hirschman Index (quantity competition). For our comparisons, we choose the time period of 2005 Q1 to 2012 Q4, i.e. starting from one boom on the market for loans and ending with another boom so that between them there is one episode of macroeconomic and systemic banking crisis that could substantially change the strength of competition. Our estimations show that the impact of competition on credit activity of banks is non-linear — when price competition is too strict or too weak the credit activity of banks becomes slower. Before the crisis of 2008—2009 increases of both price and quantity competition took place; however, during the crisis these competition improvements were offset by uneven access of banks to refinancing resources and the deterioration of borrowers’ creditworthiness that entailed the rise of risk premium in interest rates on loans. After the crisis, price competition turned back to upward trend again stimulated by the growing boom on the market for retail loans, whereas quantity competition remained rather constrained.

JEL: C23, D22, D43, G21, G28.
Keywords: banks, market for loan, competition, interest rate, price mark up, credit activity.

The article presents the results of the study that assesses the place of Russia in the global financial market. The current ratings of the global competitiveness of national financial markets and financial centers are based on objective and subjective assessment of the competitive factors. Our approach is based on objective indicators, characterizing the results of the competition, including the proportion of countries in the global financial market, P/E, and others. The article presents the results of calculations of Russia’s place in the global financial market, based on which the conclusions about the causes of the loss of positions, weak links of the Russian financial market, competitors success factors are made.

JEL: G15, F36, F65.
Keywords: global financial market, competitiveness, national financial market, international financial center, ranking, P/E, financial development, proportion of countries, long-term institutional investors.

The article deals with the history of economic research at the Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO) of the Russian Academy of Sciences. This history is analyzed in the context of the Soviet and world economic science. The specific nature of Soviet economic theory is characterized as well as a special position of IMEMO, in its function of the leading think-tank in the field of world economy and international relations. Two main directions of theoretical work of IMEMO economists are identified: transition from the facts and statistical data towards a revision of dogmatic Marxism, and from Western theories to original ideas and practical recommendations. The connection of the theory and applied expertise is given a special attention.

JEL: B20, B24, B25, B41, B51, B52.
Keywords: history of economics, methodology of economics, Soviet political economy, institutions of economic science.

The article summarizes the survey of more than 300 representatives of the Russian community of academic economists (RCAE) regarding the perception of the different tendencies in the development of economic science. It shows that despite the differences in theoretical and methodological views RCAE is a?more cohesive academic group than it is commonly believed. One of the questions that cause the greatest discrepancy in the views of the Russian economists is the attitude to the creation of "nationally oriented" economic theory. One of the main obstacles to the development of the economic science in Russia turns out to be the low level of its internationalization.

JEL: A10, A14.
Keyworlds: Russian economists, sociology of economics.